Review of: The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War without End By: Peter W. Galbraith; Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006

Peter W. Galbraith, a senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, attempts to present the numerous fallacies of U.S. policy in Iraq after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime as well as advocate for a three state solution that could extricate the U.S. from the mess in Iraq in his new book entitled, The End of Iraq: American Incompetence Created a War without End. Galbraith’s constructs a valid criticism concerning U.S. post-Saddam state building policies. He argues in the chapter entitled “Can’t Provide Anything” that U.S. policy, that was predominately constructed by L. Paul Bremer the Director of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, was not only inept but also culturally injudicious causing an unrealistic and futile commitment to maintaining a unified Iraq. Toward the end of the book, he advocates for a three state solution for Iraq. This policy consists of creating three semi-autonomous regions: Kurdistan, Shiastan, and a neo-Ba’athist region; under a loose federalist system. However, the support he provides for the policy oversimplifies various notions concerning security and has an apparent bias toward Kurdish independence, due to his personal relationship with Kurdish leaders. Galbraith’s portrayal of the various twists and turns in Iraq during the last twenty years provides the general American public with indispensable intelligence concerning the war but his reliance on anecdotal evidence severely weakens the book’s functionality from a policy perspective.

The war in Iraq continues to be a fluid situation not only politically but also academically. The decision of the Bush administration after losing the majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 2006 midterm elections to increase the quantity of troops on the ground in Iraq has altered the dynamics on the ground in the region. Although Galbraith provides an insightful analysis concerning the current situation in Iraq as of 2006, most of his fundamental arguments concerning the cultural and political incompetence of the architects of the Bush Iraq strategy have become outdated. Galbraith’s ability to utilize his personal relationships with high-level Kurdish politicians does allow him to construct a historical and political narrative pertaining to the situation in the Kurdish region of Iraq that is unique to the field. However, the field of scholarship concerning issues pertaining to the “War in Iraq” has become exceedingly diversified. Literature published by journalists, such as Thomas E. Ricks; political activists, such as Tom Hayden, economists, such Joseph Stiglitz; or even Iraqi politicians, such as Ali A. Allawi; have all constructed similar arguments to Galbraith concerning imprudent U.S. state building policy in Iraq. The expanding field amalgamates The End of Iraq within the canon of popular and academic literature concerning the Iraq War.

Galbraith’s analysis of Paul Bremer’s reconstruction policies were the most significant evidence supporting his fundamental argument that “the policies we [the U.S.] have pursued since Saddam fell on April 9, 2003, have been flawed conceptually and in execution.” He sets the political context for his criticism of Bremer in the first four chapters by thoroughly depicting the historical background to the U.S. invasion of Iraq beginning with the Iran-Iraq War that began in 1980. In chapter five “Arrogance and Ignorance” he depicts the construction of the Bush administration’s political strategy prior and during the initial military stages of the invasion of Iraq. In chapter six “Aftermath” he asserts some of his personal anecdotes from his visit to Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This historical analysis provides important insight into Iraq’s contemporary situation, but, Galbraith does not attempt to support his historical analysis by referencing other Iraq historians. This journalistic and one-sided approach creates a readable but not necessary analytical short history of Iraq. He finally introduces L. Paul Bremer on page 117 as the appointed successor of Jay Garner, a general in the U.S. army, as the principal administrator for reconstruction in postwar Iraq. He describes Bremer as the perfect candidate for the Bush administration due to his credentials as a career foreign service officer and the former special assistant to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during the Reagan administration. However, he notes that Bremer had previously never been to Iraq, did not speak Arabic, had never served in a post-conflict society, and had no experience in nation-building. This initial description of Bremer’s lack of cultural familiarity with Iraq does not seem act as a source of evidence for his argument, but creates a logical context for his criticism of Bremer’s fallible policies in Iraq.

After the forced concession of power by the Sunni Arabs to the U.S., the political framework for which Iraq subsisted was deconstructed. Bremer’s strategy for reconstructing postwar Iraq consisted of, “putting down the hammer” which was ironically quoted on page 120 from Bremer’s first meeting with Iraqi leaders. According to Galbraith, Jay Garner had planned to turn power over to the Iraqi following the detainment of Saddam Hussein. However, Bremer decided undertake the inverse of that strategy. He assumed all power concerning the reconstruction effort for himself rather than transferring authority to an Iraqi government. Galbraith asserts that according to his discussion with Iraqi leaders, including politicians that were pro-U.S. invasion, it was Bremer’s decision to maintain absolute power that changed the perception of the U.S. in Iraq from a liberator to an occupier. This strategy allowed the Bush administration to enforce policies that would construct a unified Iraq. This policy toward a unified Iraq is Galbraith’s fundamental criticism of Bremer and the Bush administration. According to Galbraith, “Iraq’s peoples do not share a common vision of the Iraqi state nor do they have common values.” This somewhat orientalist statement suggests that Galbraith is arguing that the policies implemented by Bremer and developed by the Bush administration to construct a unified Iraq are culturally unfeasible. According to the Lockeian theory of obligation as the Iraqi government, which is occupied by the U.S. government, fails to fulfill the expectations of its citizens, which according to Galbraith is a separate states, citizens have a right and will usually disobey. This criticism of U.S. policy in Iraq provides an insightful explanation for the ongoing violence throughout a fragmented Iraq. However, Galbraith’s oversimplification of his own policy for Iraq diminishes the overall value of the book within the expansive field of Iraq War studies from a policy perspective.

In the latter half of the book, Galbraith develops the argument that a three state solution in Iraq is not only in the best interest of the U.S. but also can feasibly prevent further destabilization in the region. However, Galbraith’s policy has two specific conceptual flaws that leave his policy grossly oversimplified. Firstly, his policy seems to be founded on an apparent bias toward Kurdish interests. Galbraith’s anecdotal historical analysis of the Kurdish population in Iraq in Chapter 8, entitled “Kurdistan” effectively differentiates The End of Iraq within the field of Iraq War studies but also draws out his blatant bias toward the construction of an autonomous Kurdish state. In the middle of the book, Galbraith collages various pictures from his visits to the Kurdish region of Iraq during the 1990s and 2000s. Most of images visually portray the hardships of the Kurdish people in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s regime. Yet, the images in which Galbraith himself is feature with Kurdish leaders suggests that his political interests associate with those in the Kurdish region of Iraq. In his attempt to elucidate on the history of Iraq by focusing on Kurdish region a bias toward Kurdish interests is revealed. This bias throughout his support of a three state solution suggests that his purposed policy is not necessarily in the best of the interest of the U.S., the Sunnis in the center, or the Shiites in the south but rather the best interest of the Kurdish leaders Galbraith has personal connection with that his policy be implemented. Secondly, his oversimplification of the security implications of creating three weak autonomous regions diminishes the book’s significance from a policy perspective. Galbraith states that Turkey has long been considered the major obstacle to Kurdish dreams for an independent, but, “recently, however, the Turkish Government has embraced federalism in Iraq and has even toned down public opposition to the incorporation of Kirkuk into Kurdistan.” This vague as well as unsupported statement seems to gloss over the historical tensions between Turkey and the Kurds of Iraq. In October 2007, Turkey sent troops into northern Iraq in an attempt to suppress the PKK, a Kurdish terrorist organization, in the region. Although hindsight is usually considered to be twenty-twenty, Galbraith’s lack of depth concerning the Turkish-Kurdish relationship not only severely diminishes the value of the book from a policy perspective but also suggests that his analysis has become outdated.

Galbraith thorough portrayal of the complexities of state building in Iraq should be read by any person that is interested in the Iraq War. Even though various other publications have constructed similar criticisms of U.S. post-Saddam policy in Iraq, Galbraith’s intimate knowledge of the various issues in Iraq as well as his elaborate depiction of the Kurdish point of view cements The End of Iraq as one most important books concerning the war in Iraq. However, his various oversimplification of the evidence he uses as support of a three solution in Iraq must be taken into consideration when considering this book as a policy piece.

Review of “Investing in a New Multilateralism: A Smart Power Approach to the United Nations”

This Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on the United Nation (UN)-United States (U.S.) relationship utilizes the notion of “Smart Power.” CSIS has recently developed and promoted smart power as an alternative to traditional notion of “hard power” or the notion of “soft power” developed by Joseph Nye. CSIS defined smart power as, “an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnership, and institutions of all levels to expand American influence and establish legitimacy of American action.” I think the fundamental underlining of this definition advocates that the U.S. must act in ways that expand its influence and legitimacy. This report argues that the U.S. should increase its level of participation with UN operations because it will “expand American influence and establish legitimacy of American action.”

She develops some very convincing arguments for why the newly elected Obama administration should utilize the multilateral process of the UN. She notes that the UN, more than any other international institution, remains pungent in the international system because of the legal authority established by the UN charter. The UN Charter has promoted a set of norms that shape policy of many nations throughout the world. Because the UN charter was been signed and ratified by almost all nations, heads of state are inevitable intertwined with the UN system. Therefore, as the Obama administration attempts to reestablish the U.S. standing in the world, improving relations with the UN would be a “smart” policy decision.

Another argument she lays out is in my opinion true but not original. She states that there are transnational threats—such as health and climate change—that threaten peace and security in the 21st Century. These threats not only should be a focus of U.S. foreign policy makers but have been a priority for the UN. Therefore, joint efforts by the U.S. and the UN will not only be a more effective system for combating these threats but will also enhance American influence.

There are some arguments that Johanna Mendelson Forman develops that shays a little too much on the side of an idealistic liberal institutionalist. I believe that the failures of the UN to take decisive action during the genocides in Rwanda and in Darfur should have permanently disenfranchised the UN as the foremost international peacekeeping institution. However, she argues that when diplomacy fails during a time of international crisis there should be an expanded role for the UN. I would argue that the UN Security Council, as it exists today, cannot reach a consensus on how expansive the UN’s role should be during a crisis. If the UN has not yet developed a coherent strategy for countering genocide or an aggressive dictatorship how could they now? Even if the U.S. played an even larger role in peacekeeping missions, for the UN to end an unlawful war there will still need to be consensus within the UN Security Council (UNSC). As members of the UNSC become fully immersed in the global economy a conflict of interest could lead to deaths of thousands and the degradation of a hopeful international institution.

She speaks to reform, but how can the UNSC really be reformed? Perhaps, there could be a vote in the General Assembly (UNGA) that establishes new non-veto permanent members of the UNSC but if there is no consensus among the veto members of the UNSC no action would be taken. The UNGA could vote to include more veto members of the UNSC but that would only make the process of developing a consensus even more challenging. Current members of the UNSC would surely not give up their veto right because it welds too much power. Therefore, what is there to be done? This is the question that I wish a UN scholar really attempts to tackle instead of resting on the laurels of a UNSC consensus in future on all international crises. I am not a believer of John Bolton’s goal of dismantling the UN. But, I caution arguing for a expanded UN role in peacekeeping when the likelihood of a consensus and then swift action has no historical precedent or future practicality.


To access the article please use this link:
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090128_mendelsonforman_un_smartpower_web.pdf

The Jihad’s Position in Post-Cold War Metaphysical Politics A Review of: Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity

Faisal Devji’s book, Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity, develops an intriguing analysis of the role of the Islamic “jihad”, led by the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, against the “West” within the construct of post-Cold War global political and religious chaos. The initial argument in Chapter 1, “Effects without Causes” aims to deconstruct American perceptions of the jihad created within the 9/11 Commission Report and elucidate its dualistic association between traditional Islam and a globalizing world. On the first page, Devji flips one of key arguments located toward the end 9/11 Commission Report, that in a sense, they [Al-Qaeda] were more globalized that we [the U.S.] were, on its head. Devji claims that the jihad is more global than the United States (U.S.) not because of its control over people or territory but because it is too weak to participate in such politics of control that were dominate during the Cold-War. He furthers this discussion on page 20, when he formulates his two overarching themes for the book. First, he claims that the jihad achieves globalization within a landscape of purely accidental relations, which he defines earlier as the effects from conditions, such as the East African attacks or the jihad’s transnational commercialism, in which a network like Al-Qaeda becomes global beyond politics of intentionality. Second, he argues that a consequence of the jihad outgrowing the global political landscape during the Cold-War, is that a “new kind of Muslim” is created that is not bound by the traditional cultic uniformity of Islam during that period. These two themes, which are consistent throughout the book, create an innovative and sophisticated analysis of the global jihad.

Scholarship attempting to explicate the global political order after the end of the Cold War is one of the largest fields within international relations (IR). Preeminent scholars such as: Samuel P. Huntington, Philip Bobbitt, and Francis Fukuyama, all have published extensive research concerning the landscape of the post-Cold War world order. Devji’s first theme fits within this academic discussion by incorporated the global movement of the jihad within the field. After providing the historical context for this latest jihad in chapter 2, “A Democratic History of Holy War,” which is bogged down with extremely long and convoluted history, Devji presents his initial evidence for his argument that the jihad exists within a globalized, stateless world. In Chapter 3, “Monotheistic Geographies” under the subheading, a metaphysical war, he states that, “the war itself is also a metaphysical one between Christians, Muslims and Jews… but what gives these battles global meaning is nothing less than a metaphysical war.” He uses the word metaphysical to assert that the war is based on abstract phenomena, such as culture and civilizations, rather than territory state citizenship.

This argument is similar to that of Samuel P. Huntington in his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which Huntington argues that in the post-Cold War world, for the first time in world history, global politics has become multipoloar and multicivilizational and that a clash among these civilizations for global civilizational dominance is inevitable. According to Devji, the Islamic jihad is not being waged from a single geographical region but within the global imperial arms of Americanized globalization. This associates the jihad with a new global category, in which geographical, financial, and technological mobility flows through states. In Chapter 4, “Media and Martyrdom” he provides some credence to his argument by claiming that the mobility of technology through the global media galvanizes a globally fragmented but ethically connected Islamic community to join the jihad. The arguments constructed by Devji’s in association with the Huntington’s work correlate in an interesting way to form an intriguing perspective of the power relationship between the “West” and the Islamic jihad in the post-Cold War globalized political structure.

Some of Devji arguments concerning the global position of the jihad in relation to the U.S. are however slightly short sided. Devji develops the argument that the jihad has become an impossible enemy of the U.S. because it exists beyond America’s war-making potential. This argument assumes that the only tool in which the U.S. maintains global hegemony is confounded in their military dominance. However, Devji does not fully take into consideration theories concerning the power of economic liberalism. International trade and globalizing markets affect the authority of the U.S. and the jihad within the global framework. Some affects of globalization such as the effectiveness of the jihad and transnational organized crime syndicates offer challenges to U.S. national security, however, the peace and security preserved by the interconnectivity of global markets provides the U.S. with security beyond their military might. Philip Bobbitt argues in his book, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History that the market-state has emerged as the new constitutional order at the conclusion of the Cold War The argument that the global market could dictate national or transnational strategy offers a different approach to the global landscape after the Cold War. Devji does not consider this approach throughout the book and the political economy of the jihad is left unquestioned.

The second major theme within Landscapes of the Jihad is the implications of the religion on the global jihad movement. He argues that jihad not only does not exist alongside traditional forms of Islamic devotion but also actively subverts traditional Islam. He does recognize that the at least part of genealogy of the jihad originates within some historical context with Sunni Islam and the Middle East, however, he vehemently asserts that this new global movement – known as the jihad – possesses an extraordinarily diverse membership that is not united by the way of any cultic ideology or ideological commonality and can only function as a global network that disrupts old-fashioned forms of political and religious allegiance. Chapter 5, “The Death of God” elaborates on this notion of a new kind of Muslim whose character is defined by his attitude toward the law. Devji argues that the jihad represents an ethical rather than a distinctly political or religious global movement. He comes to this reasoning because the jihad is linked neither to projects of liberation, nor to religious texts or norms in any coherent way. Therefore, he claims that Osama Bin Laden justification of the violence he has managed is not meant merely to defend Muslims or retaliate against their enemies, but to regain self-respect. Devji’s argument distorts the common American perception of a religious orientated jihad movement constructed by the media and President Bush’s “crusadic” rhetoric and develops the notion of a modern and ethical jihad movement.

This is a somewhat valid argument, because in order for the jihad to exist within the construct of modern globalization it must also exist within a new modern religious paradigm. However, Devji hints at traditional religious associations that influence the characteristic of the jihad creating contradictions within his own argument. The tri-lateral monotheistic relationship between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity has inflicted numerous wars over the last thousand years. The current conflictual relationship between Judaism and Islam was developed due to the creation of the state of Israel in the Middle East in 1948. According to Devji, “Osama Bin Laden inveighs against Jews only to warn Christians not be drawn into their battles with Muslims.” This antagonism is meant to sway Christians from siding with Jews but using this anti-Semitic rhetoric in a position of power to incite religious emotions from Muslim communities begs the question whether Devji’s arguments that the jihad exists beyond traditional Islamic paradigms are valid. Devji even quotes Bin Laden who said in 2001 that, “Jihad is a duty to liberate Al-Aqsa [the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem] and to help the powerless in Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon and in every Muslim country.” Therefore, it seems that the primary objective of the jihad still exists at least partially within the framework of the traditional Islamic plight of the Palestinians against the Israelis. Devji’s use of these statements from the leaders of the global jihad seems to dispel his notions that the characteristics of the jihad are not formed by cultic traditional paradigms of Islam.

Devji’s major arguments throughout, Landscapes of the Jihad, truly develop an intriguing perspective on the political, ethical, and religious role of the jihad in the post-Cold War geopolitical structure. Although some of his insights do not take into account some of the theories and historical contexts in which the jihad exists, the book effectively reorients misperceptions concerning the jihad in the U.S. by developing a theory for the ethical and global framework of the jihad. Although Francis Fukuyama argues that the end of the Cold War represented an end of history, deriving from Hegelian principals of ideology, some of Devji’s arguments concerning the modern, globalizing, and ethical jihadist ideology suggests that history may not quite be over yet.








References

Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History. New York: Anchor Books, 2002. 211.

Devji, Faisal. Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 2005.

Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1996. 21-28.

National Security and Foreign Direct Investment: The Exon-Florio Amendment

Edward M. Graham and David M. Marchick’s book entitled, US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment analyzes the relationship between the national security implications of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from other nations into the United States (US), and the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Act in the Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988. The book was published in May 2006 by the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The Institute is a private, nonprofit, and one of the few economic think tanks that are widely regarded as nonpartisan. Graham was a senior fellow at the Peterson’s institute as well as an economist for the US Treasury while Marchick is a partner with Covington & Burling and is recognized as one of the leading experts on the Exon-Florio amendment. The book contains six chapters as well as an executive summary. The book provides an encompassing analysis of the effects of the Exon-Florio amendment on the international political economy eighteen years after its legislation.

Chapter One illustrates the history of FDI in the US economy. They provide an analysis of US reactions to surges in FDI during World War I, World War II and the late 1980s leading to the Exon-Florio amendment. Even though FDI has become critical to the vibrancy of the US economy the notion that foreign firms could become dominate over US-developed technology caused rising concerns over the implications of FDI on national security. Chapter Two analyzes the legislative history of the Exon-Florio amendment. The amendment states that the President can block a transaction only if credible evidence exists that the foreign acquirer might take action that threatens national security. The evidence is reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) and then presented to the President. Chapter Three examines the positive, such as efficiency spillovers in the auto industry, and negative, such as domestic firms cannot compete with some foreign firms causing a migration of labor toward foreign firms, economic effects of FDI. Chapter Four introduces their case study on the recent surge of Chinese FDI into the US. From a strategic perspective China’s attempt to acquire parts of US companies causes a variety of issues. Out of the ten largest trading partners with the US, China is the only country that is not considered a strategic or political ally. CFIUS reviews cases that usually involve highly sensitive exports of technology and China, during the last decade, has been linked to a series of high-profile breeches of US export control laws and regulations. Therefore, FDI from China will most likely be seen by CFIUS as well as various intelligence agencies as an attempt to build military strength. However, Graham and Marchick suggest that the US should continue to support China’s integration into the global economy as a positive step toward China’s economic development and possibly democratization. Chapter Five portrays the effects of the CFIUS process becoming more politicized. US companies have attempted to influence or politicize the CFIUS process to advance commercial interests unrelated to national security. Graham and Marchick conclude that this process costs the US economy by increasing uncertainty for foreign investors shying them away from acquiring US companies which therefore lowers the value of US companies. Chapter Six concludes with ideas to be included, such as adding protection of critical infrastructure as a factor for CFIUS consideration, and rejected, such as including an economic security test, by Congress to improve the Exon-Florio amendment and CFIUS.

In 1995 Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman published Foreign Direct Investment in the United States. This book became the scholarly foundation for studying the effects of FDI on the US economy. Eleven years later, Graham and Marchick book utilize that foundation to elucidate on the effects of the Exon-Florio amendment on the US economy. They conclude that without FDI, US manufacturing, employment, competitiveness, and innovation will be at risk. However, as firms attempt to influence the CFIUS process toward their own self-interest the aggregate of the US economy could also become at risk but their own profit margins would be sustained in the short-run. The debate within the CFIUS between protecting US corporations’ global economic hegemony and the fundamental neoclassical economic theory free markets hovers throughout the book.

Can Solidarity Actually Save Strangers? A Review of: Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society

International relation theorists who argue that the international society should act as guardian of human rights through ethical humanitarian interventions provide a provocative philosophy of a universal duty of states to support the unsupportable. However, the descriptive history of humanitarian intervention in which the continual refusal from the most powerful of states to allow a possibly unfavorable international precedent suggests that solidarism effectively functions within a book but would fail on the ground in the next grand humanitarian crisis. Nicholas J. Wheeler, a senior lecturer at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, in his book, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, conducts a fascinating normative and descriptive analysis of humanitarian interventions during the Cold-War and post-Cold War eras. However, his fundamental arguments about the ethical norms of states that should construct a moral universality concerning humanitarianism fall short of developing a tangible possible solution to a humanitarian crisis. It was not clear after concluding the book, why this book, that sophisticatedly examined the history of seven important humanitarian missions under the framework of solidarism, is important if states will continue to act on behalf of their own national interest. The question that seems more relevant is how can the international society “save strangers” if the construct of the international system remains dominated by what John Mearsheimer refers to as an orderly anarchic realism?

Wheeler’s introduction effectively illustrates the important theoretical discussions within the fields of human rights and humanitarian intervention. Wheeler lays out the dualism within the study of humanitarian intervention claiming that, “humanitarian intervention exposes the conflict between order and justice at its starkest.” He elucidates these notions of order and justice by referring to the concepts of pluralism and solidarism within the English School of international relations theory. Throughout the latter section of the introduction and the first chapter, “Humanitarian Intervention and International Society”, Wheeler defines the meaning of pluralism and solidarism within the scope of humanitarian intervention. He defines the pluralist international-society theory view of humanitarian intervention as a violation of the cardinal rules of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force. An intervention, according to his definition of pluralist theorists, within another country not only defies the rules that are fundamental for international order but also could endanger the sovereign structure. Wheeler challenges this view that utilizing the concept of solidarism. He argues that the international system can be strengthened by deepening the commitment to justice by developing a system of international norms and standards.

Wheeler thoroughly and sophisticatedly develops the theoretical foundations for pluralism and solidarism. He successful asserts the solidarism approach as the fundamental framework for examining the descriptive history of humanitarian interventions. However, his arguments against the sustainability of pluralism lack definitive resolve. He identifies what the claims as a fundamental hypocrisy within the foundation of the pluralist argument for humanitarian intervention. He claims that pluralism defends the rules of society on the grounds that they uphold the conceptions of the ‘good’. However, he argues that that claim is a contradiction because the moral justification of the rules differ from actual human rights practices of states. He refers to pluralist scholar Robert H. Jackson and his ‘egg-box’ theory in his footnotes in which the intrinsic value of all states is defined by their sovereignty but also their juridical equality. Jackson’s thesis in his book, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States, develops the argument that this contradiction, primarily in the cases of the Gulf War and the Bosnia, Kosovo crises actually demonstrates the continued durability of the world system, defined by the Treaty of Westphalia, rather than its decline. Wheeler touches on this point in his discussion of United Nations (UN) Security Council authorization. He constructs a moral argument claiming that ethical concerns should trump legality. Jackson and Pluralists would maintain that legality supports international peace and security; however this Grotian view of international relations assumes that states should accept not only a moral responsibility to protect but also the wider guardianship of human rights everywhere. This new moral discussion, which is also taken by Barnett and Finnemore to describe UN authority, does not deconstruct the pluralist argument because it also does not reflect the actual human rights practices of states, and fundamental leaves the reader pondering whether strangers can actually be saved.

In latter half of the book, Wheeler conducts a descriptive analysis of seven humanitarian interventions broken up into two sections: during the Cold-War and after the Cold-War. The section including three humanitarian interventions, India into Bangladesh, Vietnam into Cambodia, and Tanzania into Uganda, furthered the descriptive field of humanitarian history because these events were deemed illegitimate. Thomas G. Weiss’s book, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, which is one of the preeminent histories of the UN, uses only the interventions in the Palestinian, Korean, Suez and Congolese crises as his case studies for Cold-War security efforts. However, Wheeler’s choice of case studies more effectively explicates the theoretical debate between pluralism and solidarism. Each of these cases were uniquely different from the latter, post-Cold War, cases because every intervention was conducted by a lesser developed country and each were for the most part successful at bringing an end to a crisis.
However, the response from the international community to deem each intervention as international illegitimate pegs the question whether solidarism could ever realistically be the theoretical framework used by international humanitarian policy-makers. The argument raised by General Olusegen Obasanjo of Nigeria that individual states do not have a ‘duty’ to use force to change the ‘morality’ of another government with which they disagree suggests that sovereignty still dominates the structure of the international system because moral authority is not universal. Even though the interventions were successful, the ethical justifications for the interventions suggest that states could construct an argument for their own moral superior to conduct an intervention in another country. The solidarity argument that the commitment by the international toward a universally accepted concept of justice could strengthen the stability of the international system works within the framework of Wheeler’s fundamental arguments, however, as powerful states continue to protect their sovereignty ethical humanitarian interventions will also occur when it is in the best interest of a capable state.

The final section of the book examines post-Cold War interventions that were conducted, or in the case of Rwanda not conducted, by powerful countries, especially the United States. Wheeler’s description of the Kuwaiti intervention by the United States under the legal jurisdiction of the UN does not provide any additional historical incites that have not already been examined by the field. However, a discussion concerning the selectivity of exceptionality provides more credence to the realist argument that states still act in their own best interest. The legality of the U.S. and UN intervention in Somalia had be legally utilize the words, ‘unique’, ‘extraordinary’, and ‘exceptional’ in order for the Chinese and Indian delegations at the Security Council to adopt the resolution. Similarity in the case of NATO intervention in Kosovo the German foreign minister Kinkel emphasized that Kosovo was a special case and that it should not be taken as a green light for future NATO actions outside the authority of the Security Council. However, in the case of Rwanda, in which more Rwandans died during the 1994 genocide, was not deemed exceptional and the United States due to the horrific aftermath of the Somalia intervention did not believe it was in the best interest of the state to intervene. This selectivity by the UN and powerful states within the international community, especially the United States, suggests that a universally accepted commitment to international justice and humanitarianism, which Wheeler continuously argues throughout the book would strengthen the legitimacy of the international society, has not yet come to fruition.

Wheeler’s study of solidarism in Saving Strangers illustrates the potential power of a collective global identity toward humanitarian intervention in an intra-state or inter-state humanitarian crisis. The prose throughout the book, especially in the introductory section, marks Wheeler as one of the preeminent scholars of solidarity. However, the reality of the descriptive history of humanitarian interventions during the latter half of the 20th century signifies that states continue to act under a pluralist and realist theoretical framework. This truism limits the Wheeler’s thesis to a mere academic exercise.

References

Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 2004.

Lynch, Cecelia. Rev. of The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States, by Robert Jackson. The American Political Science Review Dec. 2002: 883-884.

Mearsheimer, John J. "The False Promise of International Relations." International Security 19 (1995): 5-49.

Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate, and Kelly-Kate Pease. The United Nations and Changing World Politics. 5th ed. Boulder: Westview P, 2007.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000.