Review of: The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War without End By: Peter W. Galbraith; Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006

Peter W. Galbraith, a senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, attempts to present the numerous fallacies of U.S. policy in Iraq after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime as well as advocate for a three state solution that could extricate the U.S. from the mess in Iraq in his new book entitled, The End of Iraq: American Incompetence Created a War without End. Galbraith’s constructs a valid criticism concerning U.S. post-Saddam state building policies. He argues in the chapter entitled “Can’t Provide Anything” that U.S. policy, that was predominately constructed by L. Paul Bremer the Director of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, was not only inept but also culturally injudicious causing an unrealistic and futile commitment to maintaining a unified Iraq. Toward the end of the book, he advocates for a three state solution for Iraq. This policy consists of creating three semi-autonomous regions: Kurdistan, Shiastan, and a neo-Ba’athist region; under a loose federalist system. However, the support he provides for the policy oversimplifies various notions concerning security and has an apparent bias toward Kurdish independence, due to his personal relationship with Kurdish leaders. Galbraith’s portrayal of the various twists and turns in Iraq during the last twenty years provides the general American public with indispensable intelligence concerning the war but his reliance on anecdotal evidence severely weakens the book’s functionality from a policy perspective.

The war in Iraq continues to be a fluid situation not only politically but also academically. The decision of the Bush administration after losing the majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 2006 midterm elections to increase the quantity of troops on the ground in Iraq has altered the dynamics on the ground in the region. Although Galbraith provides an insightful analysis concerning the current situation in Iraq as of 2006, most of his fundamental arguments concerning the cultural and political incompetence of the architects of the Bush Iraq strategy have become outdated. Galbraith’s ability to utilize his personal relationships with high-level Kurdish politicians does allow him to construct a historical and political narrative pertaining to the situation in the Kurdish region of Iraq that is unique to the field. However, the field of scholarship concerning issues pertaining to the “War in Iraq” has become exceedingly diversified. Literature published by journalists, such as Thomas E. Ricks; political activists, such as Tom Hayden, economists, such Joseph Stiglitz; or even Iraqi politicians, such as Ali A. Allawi; have all constructed similar arguments to Galbraith concerning imprudent U.S. state building policy in Iraq. The expanding field amalgamates The End of Iraq within the canon of popular and academic literature concerning the Iraq War.

Galbraith’s analysis of Paul Bremer’s reconstruction policies were the most significant evidence supporting his fundamental argument that “the policies we [the U.S.] have pursued since Saddam fell on April 9, 2003, have been flawed conceptually and in execution.” He sets the political context for his criticism of Bremer in the first four chapters by thoroughly depicting the historical background to the U.S. invasion of Iraq beginning with the Iran-Iraq War that began in 1980. In chapter five “Arrogance and Ignorance” he depicts the construction of the Bush administration’s political strategy prior and during the initial military stages of the invasion of Iraq. In chapter six “Aftermath” he asserts some of his personal anecdotes from his visit to Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This historical analysis provides important insight into Iraq’s contemporary situation, but, Galbraith does not attempt to support his historical analysis by referencing other Iraq historians. This journalistic and one-sided approach creates a readable but not necessary analytical short history of Iraq. He finally introduces L. Paul Bremer on page 117 as the appointed successor of Jay Garner, a general in the U.S. army, as the principal administrator for reconstruction in postwar Iraq. He describes Bremer as the perfect candidate for the Bush administration due to his credentials as a career foreign service officer and the former special assistant to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during the Reagan administration. However, he notes that Bremer had previously never been to Iraq, did not speak Arabic, had never served in a post-conflict society, and had no experience in nation-building. This initial description of Bremer’s lack of cultural familiarity with Iraq does not seem act as a source of evidence for his argument, but creates a logical context for his criticism of Bremer’s fallible policies in Iraq.

After the forced concession of power by the Sunni Arabs to the U.S., the political framework for which Iraq subsisted was deconstructed. Bremer’s strategy for reconstructing postwar Iraq consisted of, “putting down the hammer” which was ironically quoted on page 120 from Bremer’s first meeting with Iraqi leaders. According to Galbraith, Jay Garner had planned to turn power over to the Iraqi following the detainment of Saddam Hussein. However, Bremer decided undertake the inverse of that strategy. He assumed all power concerning the reconstruction effort for himself rather than transferring authority to an Iraqi government. Galbraith asserts that according to his discussion with Iraqi leaders, including politicians that were pro-U.S. invasion, it was Bremer’s decision to maintain absolute power that changed the perception of the U.S. in Iraq from a liberator to an occupier. This strategy allowed the Bush administration to enforce policies that would construct a unified Iraq. This policy toward a unified Iraq is Galbraith’s fundamental criticism of Bremer and the Bush administration. According to Galbraith, “Iraq’s peoples do not share a common vision of the Iraqi state nor do they have common values.” This somewhat orientalist statement suggests that Galbraith is arguing that the policies implemented by Bremer and developed by the Bush administration to construct a unified Iraq are culturally unfeasible. According to the Lockeian theory of obligation as the Iraqi government, which is occupied by the U.S. government, fails to fulfill the expectations of its citizens, which according to Galbraith is a separate states, citizens have a right and will usually disobey. This criticism of U.S. policy in Iraq provides an insightful explanation for the ongoing violence throughout a fragmented Iraq. However, Galbraith’s oversimplification of his own policy for Iraq diminishes the overall value of the book within the expansive field of Iraq War studies from a policy perspective.

In the latter half of the book, Galbraith develops the argument that a three state solution in Iraq is not only in the best interest of the U.S. but also can feasibly prevent further destabilization in the region. However, Galbraith’s policy has two specific conceptual flaws that leave his policy grossly oversimplified. Firstly, his policy seems to be founded on an apparent bias toward Kurdish interests. Galbraith’s anecdotal historical analysis of the Kurdish population in Iraq in Chapter 8, entitled “Kurdistan” effectively differentiates The End of Iraq within the field of Iraq War studies but also draws out his blatant bias toward the construction of an autonomous Kurdish state. In the middle of the book, Galbraith collages various pictures from his visits to the Kurdish region of Iraq during the 1990s and 2000s. Most of images visually portray the hardships of the Kurdish people in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s regime. Yet, the images in which Galbraith himself is feature with Kurdish leaders suggests that his political interests associate with those in the Kurdish region of Iraq. In his attempt to elucidate on the history of Iraq by focusing on Kurdish region a bias toward Kurdish interests is revealed. This bias throughout his support of a three state solution suggests that his purposed policy is not necessarily in the best of the interest of the U.S., the Sunnis in the center, or the Shiites in the south but rather the best interest of the Kurdish leaders Galbraith has personal connection with that his policy be implemented. Secondly, his oversimplification of the security implications of creating three weak autonomous regions diminishes the book’s significance from a policy perspective. Galbraith states that Turkey has long been considered the major obstacle to Kurdish dreams for an independent, but, “recently, however, the Turkish Government has embraced federalism in Iraq and has even toned down public opposition to the incorporation of Kirkuk into Kurdistan.” This vague as well as unsupported statement seems to gloss over the historical tensions between Turkey and the Kurds of Iraq. In October 2007, Turkey sent troops into northern Iraq in an attempt to suppress the PKK, a Kurdish terrorist organization, in the region. Although hindsight is usually considered to be twenty-twenty, Galbraith’s lack of depth concerning the Turkish-Kurdish relationship not only severely diminishes the value of the book from a policy perspective but also suggests that his analysis has become outdated.

Galbraith thorough portrayal of the complexities of state building in Iraq should be read by any person that is interested in the Iraq War. Even though various other publications have constructed similar criticisms of U.S. post-Saddam policy in Iraq, Galbraith’s intimate knowledge of the various issues in Iraq as well as his elaborate depiction of the Kurdish point of view cements The End of Iraq as one most important books concerning the war in Iraq. However, his various oversimplification of the evidence he uses as support of a three solution in Iraq must be taken into consideration when considering this book as a policy piece.

Review of “Investing in a New Multilateralism: A Smart Power Approach to the United Nations”

This Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on the United Nation (UN)-United States (U.S.) relationship utilizes the notion of “Smart Power.” CSIS has recently developed and promoted smart power as an alternative to traditional notion of “hard power” or the notion of “soft power” developed by Joseph Nye. CSIS defined smart power as, “an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnership, and institutions of all levels to expand American influence and establish legitimacy of American action.” I think the fundamental underlining of this definition advocates that the U.S. must act in ways that expand its influence and legitimacy. This report argues that the U.S. should increase its level of participation with UN operations because it will “expand American influence and establish legitimacy of American action.”

She develops some very convincing arguments for why the newly elected Obama administration should utilize the multilateral process of the UN. She notes that the UN, more than any other international institution, remains pungent in the international system because of the legal authority established by the UN charter. The UN Charter has promoted a set of norms that shape policy of many nations throughout the world. Because the UN charter was been signed and ratified by almost all nations, heads of state are inevitable intertwined with the UN system. Therefore, as the Obama administration attempts to reestablish the U.S. standing in the world, improving relations with the UN would be a “smart” policy decision.

Another argument she lays out is in my opinion true but not original. She states that there are transnational threats—such as health and climate change—that threaten peace and security in the 21st Century. These threats not only should be a focus of U.S. foreign policy makers but have been a priority for the UN. Therefore, joint efforts by the U.S. and the UN will not only be a more effective system for combating these threats but will also enhance American influence.

There are some arguments that Johanna Mendelson Forman develops that shays a little too much on the side of an idealistic liberal institutionalist. I believe that the failures of the UN to take decisive action during the genocides in Rwanda and in Darfur should have permanently disenfranchised the UN as the foremost international peacekeeping institution. However, she argues that when diplomacy fails during a time of international crisis there should be an expanded role for the UN. I would argue that the UN Security Council, as it exists today, cannot reach a consensus on how expansive the UN’s role should be during a crisis. If the UN has not yet developed a coherent strategy for countering genocide or an aggressive dictatorship how could they now? Even if the U.S. played an even larger role in peacekeeping missions, for the UN to end an unlawful war there will still need to be consensus within the UN Security Council (UNSC). As members of the UNSC become fully immersed in the global economy a conflict of interest could lead to deaths of thousands and the degradation of a hopeful international institution.

She speaks to reform, but how can the UNSC really be reformed? Perhaps, there could be a vote in the General Assembly (UNGA) that establishes new non-veto permanent members of the UNSC but if there is no consensus among the veto members of the UNSC no action would be taken. The UNGA could vote to include more veto members of the UNSC but that would only make the process of developing a consensus even more challenging. Current members of the UNSC would surely not give up their veto right because it welds too much power. Therefore, what is there to be done? This is the question that I wish a UN scholar really attempts to tackle instead of resting on the laurels of a UNSC consensus in future on all international crises. I am not a believer of John Bolton’s goal of dismantling the UN. But, I caution arguing for a expanded UN role in peacekeeping when the likelihood of a consensus and then swift action has no historical precedent or future practicality.


To access the article please use this link:
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090128_mendelsonforman_un_smartpower_web.pdf