“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics”: A synopsis of Robert Putnam’s Significant Work

Robert D. Putnam’s essay, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” was featured in the journal International Organization, summer of 1988. Robert Putnam currently is Peter and Isabel Malkin Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University and the Kennedy School of Government. This essay precedes Professor Putnam’s most influential books, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community and Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy which are ranked among the most cited social science publications worldwide. The primary purpose of “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics” is to offer a theoretical approach toward untangling the relationship between international relations (IR) and domestic politics. He begins by presenting his case study, the Bonn Summit Conference of 1978. He explains the entanglement through developing the theoretical framework of the two-level game from the Bonn Summit of 1978 as well as determinates of the win-sets for the two representations of negotiations in international relations and domestic politics. Putnam’s application of the two-level game toward international negotiations remains relevant as the dynamics of international trade remains entangled between international relations and domestic politics.

Putnam prefaces the framework for the two-level game by deconstructing the relevance of a state-centric approach toward untangling the relationship between IR and domestic politics claiming that state-centric literature is an uncertain foundation. He concurs with Walton and McKersie that a unitary-actor assumption is often misleading and a two-level game approach more appropriately depicts the politics of international negotiations. The two-level game consists of the interconnection between the national level, where domestic groups pursue their own self-interests by lobbying the government to adopt policies in their favor and at the international level where national governments seek to maximize not only their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures but also minimize adverse consequences of foreign developments. Putnam decomposes the ratification processes of any two-level game into two stages: Level 1 (L1) and Level 2 (L2). L1 is the bargaining between negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement and L2 is a separate discussion within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement. Putnam defines the win-sets for the dualistic ratification processes into first, larger win-sets make L1 agreements more likely and second the relative size of the respective L2 win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint-gains from the international bargain.

Putnam defines three factors that are important in determining the circumstances that affect the size of a win-set. Firstly, the size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power between internationalists and isolationists, homogenous or heterogeneous preferences and possible coalitions among L2 constituents. Secondly, the size of the win-set depends on the L2 political institutions and ratifications procedures. Thirdly, the size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the L1 negotiators. This includes the usage of side-payments to maximize cost effectiveness of concessions as well as the negotiators own demands and threats, uncertainty and misinformation about L2 politics on either side of the table. Putnam concludes that the only formal link between L1 and L2 negotiations are the motives of the chief negotiator which include enhancing his standing in the L2 game, shifting the balance of power at L2, and pursing his own conception of the national interest in the international context.

The theoretical analysis of Putnam’s article, according to Leonard J. Schoppa, contributed significantly to the understanding of the dynamics of international negotiations. The article eventually inspired a collaborative project that used case studies to elucidate and refine the model. The project culminated with the publications of the 1993 book Double-Edged Diplomacy: Bargaining and Domestic Politics edited by Putnam, Peter B. Evans, and Harold K. Jacobson. In a review of the book from “The American Political Science Review”, Manus I Midlarsky calls the book, “an important landmark in what has become a virtual flood tide of recent works deemphasizing the international system as an explanatory focus.” The entanglement between IR and domestic politics continues to be an important issue post-Cold War and 9/11 and therefore Putnam’s framework continues to explain the “how” and “why”.