Benjamin J. Cohen’s essay, “A Brief History of International Monetary Relations” and Barry Eichengreen’s essay, “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System” appear in consecutive order within the 1995 anthology International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth edited by Jeffery A. Friedman and David A. Lake. Cohen, a professor of international political economic at University of California, Santa Barbara, elucidates on the progression of the international monetary system from an international political economy perspective while Eichengreen, a professor of economics and political science at the University of California Berkeley, goes a step further by analyzing the applicability of hegemonic stability theory on the genesis of the international monetary system but especially specific functions of the various systems. The Cohen article and the Eichengreen article offer different perspectives of the historical development of the international monetary system but their discussions complement each other creating a comprehensive analysis.
Cohen provides an historical analysis of the evolution of the international monetary system from the classical gold standard through the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. He immediately begins to construct the history beginning with the establishment of the international gold standard in the 1870s. Traditionally the era of the gold standard, from the 1870s to World War I, was characterized as “The Golden Age”. However, Cohen develops the argument that “The Golden Age” was a deceptive façade due to misconceptions about the practice of adjustment and the roles of national monetary policies. The interwar period, which attempted to economize the gold standard, was “doomed from the start,” due to the fundamental misconceptions of the prewar monetary system conditions. Cohen’s analysis of the Bretton Woods System is contrived from the compromises between the plans of Harry D. White and John M. Keynes for monetary reconstruction. Finally, Cohen categorizes the Bretton Woods era into two periods, firstly, the period of “dollar shortage”, which led to a beneficial disequilibrium of the international monetary system and secondly, the period of “dollar glut”, where global inflation led to the eventually collapse in 1971 of the fixed exchange rate system.
Eichengreen extrapolates on the evolution of the international monetary system by analyzing the applicability of hegemonic stability theory (HST) on three operations of the monetary system: adjustment, liquidity and the lender of last resort.
These articles, even though appear in consecutive order in Friedman and
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